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Social Order: Voluntary Agreement and
Consent in Pre-colonial Somali Society
Jamal Abdi

I. Introduction
In 1993 Mancur Olson wrote: "While there have been lots of writings
about the desirability of "social contracts" to obtain the benefits of law
and order, no one has ever found a large society that obtained a peaceful order or other public goods through an agreement among the individuals in the society.”1 The preceding assertion is as accurate today as
it was when put forth by Olson.
The first part of this paper reasons that pre-colonial Somali society constitutes an example of a large society where social order was
garnered, and where public goods, (i.e., law and order, security, and
protection of property rights) were provided by voluntary agreement
among individuals in society. That is, in the absence of formal authority, coercion, hierarchy, or utilization of selective incentives. In arguing
that social order was obtained, and public goods provided by voluntary agreement among individuals, much focus is put on the complementary relationship between the Somali genealogical structure and
the xeer system. The former being the principal form of social organization with the latter adding governance to it. Through a discussion on the complementary relationship between the two systems, it
is shown that collective action was feasible both within and between
communities, making pre-colonial Somali society the sole known large
society characterized by feasibility of collective action in the absence
of coercion, hierarchy, utilization of selective incentives, and authority.
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While Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau disagree on the nature of man in
the state of nature, the common denominator of their theories is that
authority, capable of exercising coercive power, is necessary for the
establishment of a civil society.2 Locke, for instance, wrote that “the
great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths,
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
property; to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.”3 Put in other words, the state is considered the safeguard of
man's life, liberty, and estate.
For this reason, the state is considered irreversible in the modern
world, as Buzan put it, "there is no real option of going back."4 Even if
we accept that man, in the state of nature, was rather reasonable and
rational would his reason and rationality not become an implacable
enemy of collective action? Against this backdrop, it is quite remarkable that men, free and equal amongst one another, produced a peaceful social order in pre-colonial Somali society by voluntary agreement,
i.e., in the absence of structured authority to decide disputes and punish offenders. What, then, explains the presence of a command-obedience relationship in the absence of central power or even hierarchy?
Why did people consent to norms and obey the rules and laws? What
constitutes the source of the moral authority that enabled the xeer system to issue commands and demand obedience in the absence of coercive power?
The second part of this essay is more analytical and bears the burden of answering these questions. A revised version of David Beetham's (1991) theory on legitimacy is used to analyze the obtainment of
social order in a context devoid of authority and hierarchy. The xeer
system is considered a regime and it is theorized that social order may
be obtained without formal authority if society is characterized by feasibility of collective action and uniformity of shared beliefs. If a regime,
understood in this context as a system of governance, conforms to the
shared beliefs in society and the latter is typified by uniformity of shared
beliefs, a likely result is that it becomes indistinguishable from them in
terms of legitimacy. Consequently, the laws, rules, values, principles,
and norms that constituted the xeer system were considered legitimate.
Hence, the xeer system could issue commands and demand obedience.
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The xeer system was, in other words, a normative and moral authority that could issue commands and demand obedience because it
derived its greater legitimacy from society’s external and internal ultimate source of authority, i.e., Islam and Somali culture. By providing
an account of why the xeer system worked, i.e., what enabled it to issue
commands and demand obedience in the absence of authority capable of exercising coercive power, this paper is an effort to deepen our
understanding of governance in pre-colonial Somali society. Since the
main contention put forth is that the pre-colonial Somali people constituted an example of a large society where social order was obtained
by voluntary agreement, a working definition of a “large society” is
needed before we proceed. The definition offered here focuses not on
quantification of population size. Suggesting a fixed number, say e.g.,
a million-plus people, is evidently arbitrary in nature. A “large society”
is understood in this essay as a human community where knowledge
of commonality between its members is not acquired through faceto-face relationships as is characteristic of ‘primary groups,”5 but a
human association in which commonality between members is imagined6 and where members are dispersed across an extensive territory,
rendering tight intimacy with most other members improbable. The
Somali people inhabit a large territory on the Horn of Africa of about
643.7376 square kilometers.7 Even if one assumes that the genealogical
and xeer system were confined to the pastoralists, which there is hardly
any evidence to suggest, who mainly inhabit the area currently known
as Somaliland and as British Somaliland Protectorate during colonial
era, one is referring to an area of about 137.6000 square kilometers or
about the size of England and Wales put together.8
II. Collective Action
Collective action theory was first formulated by Mancur Olson in his
now seminal book, The Logic of Collective Action. The fundamental
assumption that constitutes the point of departure of collective action
theory is one based upon the conflict between individual rationality
and collective rationality.9 That is, rational individuals do not voluntarily pursue action with the aim of achieving the collective interest of
their respective groups. In a nutshell, what is rational on an individual
level is not rational on a collective level, rendering voluntary cooperation in large groups, in the absence of coercion or outside inducements,
virtually impossible.10 As Olson puts it:
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In a large group in which no single individual's contribution makes
a perceptible difference to the group as a whole or the burden or benefit of any single member of the group, it is certain that a collective good
will not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside inducements that will lead the members of the large group to act in their
common interest.11
The literature on collective action is now vast, rich and far more complex than the brief introduction provided here.12 However, it remains
the case that no one has hitherto been able to identify a large society
where collective action was feasible, allowing for obtainment of social
order by voluntary agreement among individuals in society. The following sections bear the burden of showing that collective action was
feasible, both within and between communities, in pre-colonial Somali
society, rendering obtainment of social order by voluntary agreement
possible.
III. The Genealogical System
The Somali genealogical13 structure,14 a very complex and sophisticated
system of social organization and social identity formation, constitutes
the main source of division within an otherwise largely homogenous
nation.15 The genealogical structure consists of five main genealogically related communities: the Dir, Issaq, Darood, Hawiye, and Rahanweyn. Each of these can be further divided into major sub-groups,
primary lineage groups and mug-paying groups.16 In other words, each
major group and sub-groups are further divided into various smaller
groups based on common descent all the way down to the smallest collective entity possible. Thus, an individual, in Somali society, embodies
different kinship-based social identifications, any one of which will
become salient depending on the context. Moral proximity and genealogical proximity are closely intertwined within this structure. All
the agnatic groups between the major groups and the nuclear family
are essentially in-groups, characterized by a strong sense of fellow
feeling. The closer the genealogical ties are between individuals and/
or sub-groups, the stronger is the sense of fellow feeling between them.
Conversely, moral proximity fades and peters out as the genealogical
distance grows, stressing the centrality of genealogy within the Somali
genealogical structure. The Somali word for genealogy is “Abtirsiinyo”
and means a recitation of agnation. Somalis bear their father's first
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name as their own surname, enabling them to trace their ancestors
patrilineally in the male line. As Lewis observes:
It is a matter of family pride to teach children their father's genealogy. This duty usually bestows mainly on the mother and the ease
with which small children of eight or nine years can recite their genealogies up to their clan-family ancestor is astonishing, especially since
the genealogy may include well over twenty names, some of which
are repetitive. Everyone knows his genealogy up to the eponym of his
clan-family.17
Thus, memorizing one's genealogy allows individuals to easily
establish proximity in relation to others and determine the membership
of kinship-based in-groups all the way to the main genealogical community.
IV.Governance (Xeer)and Conflict Resolution
Characteristic of the Somali genealogical-structure is the complete
absence of hierarchy both within and between groups,18 setting it apart
from other so-called traditional social organizations that are normally
characterized by formal and stable hierarchy, e.g. chief structures and
the like. In pre-colonial Somali society, no single individual had the
authority to make unilateral decisions on behalf of a group or sanction
unacceptable behavior. All important decisions were reached collectively by agreement, made possible by a set of publicly negotiated
and universally accepted laws, values, norms, principles, ideals, and
codes of conduct that combined define the Xeer-system.19 In Somali,
Xeer can mean, although related, different things depending upon the
context within which the word is used. When translated to English,
Xeer means custom or contract.20 Based on Somali cultural values, principles, and elements of Islam,21 the Xeer system defined acceptable
behavior, and thus regulated both intra- and inter-group relations in an
otherwise non-hierarchical context.22
Three equally important and inextricably linked pillars constitute
the fundamental building blocks of the Xeer system. First, the Xeer system is, as mentioned above, based on a mixture of Somali values, laws,
principles and elements of Islam.23 Through these laws, values and
principles, normative questions such as what ought to be considered
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“right” or “just” are answered, providing a publicly negotiated and
universally accepted moral and normative framework for co-existence.
Second, the Xeer system provides guidelines and procedures for decision-making and conflict resolution.24 Characteristic of these procedures is that they are non- hierarchical and democratic; decisions are
reached by voluntary agreement between disputant parties.25 Third,
decisions reached are considered “legally” binding and are normally
honored and upheld voluntarily by involved stakeholders,26 stressing
the self-regulatory nature of the Xeer system. Historically, and to some
extent presently, conflict resolution and reconciliation was sought for at
ad hoc community meetings (Shiir in Somali) between disputant parties on virtually all imaginable issues and topics,27 These community
councils allowed for contesting parties to present their case in front of
the wider community and collectively selected arbitrators. Steered by
Somali cultural values, principles and Islam,28 the main goal of these
ad hoc Shiir-councils was to seek justice (Xaqq in Somali) and reach
a voluntary agreement between involved stakeholders by peaceful
negotiations.29 Compromises reached were considered “legally binding” and the involved communities were responsible for ensuring that
they were respected and upheld, not merely in the present but also
in the future, creating a sort of “legal” precedence for future generations.30 Another significant feature of Shiir-councils is that they were
somewhat democratic, allowing all adult men equal access and participation irrespective of their social status31. Another component of the
Xeer system in relation to conflict resolution and reconciliation was the
“Guurti,” an informal ad hoc panel32 whose members were collectively
selected, not because of their social background or because they held
titles or could enforce decisions by coercive means, but mainly because
they were experienced, wise, knowledgeable, and widely respected. It
is important to stress that Guurti-members were essentially arbitrators
and had no authority to either make or enforce any decisions. As Lewis
notes,
This informal court of arbitrators has no means of enforcing its findings, in these circumstances, settlements thus ultimately depend upon
the readiness of the disputants to make peace and to some degree on
the skill of the arbitrators in obtaining an acceptable compromise.33
Distinguishing a Guurti council from ordinary Shiir councils is that
the former would normally only be arranged in circumstances of seri171
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ous inter-group crisis.34 While both Shiir and Guurti councils were vital
conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms and undeniably
added significant structure and governance to the loose community-based system, compromises were reached by voluntary agreement
through peaceful negotiations. Collective action was, in other words,
feasible both within and between communities. Even when an acceptable compromise between disputant parties proved unobtainable, the
violent conflicts that ensued would normally not exceed the frame of
publicly negotiated and broadly accepted codes of conduct. In other
words, virtually all aspects of both intra- and inter-group relations
were managed and regulated within the realm of the collectively
negotiated and broadly accepted normative and moral foundation of
the Xeer system. Consequently, man's life, liberty, and estate35 were
guaranteed in the absence of any type of over-arching authority capable of exercising coercive power. Hence, the contention that pre-colonial
Somali society might be the sole known large society to obtain social
order by voluntary agreement among individuals in society. What,
then, explains the presence of a command-obedience relationship in
the absence of authority or even hierarchy? What constitutes the source
of the moral authority that made people obey the rules? Although
formulated in the context of formal power (e.g., government), David
Beetham's theory of legitimacy is useful in answering these questions.
V. Legitimacy
Max Weber is broadly considered one of the founding fathers of twentieth-century social science and has influenced numerous disciplines.36
His definition of the state, for instance, as the "form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a human community,"37 remains the most widely
used definition of the state in the study of politics. Together with JeanJacques Rousseau, Weber has profoundly influenced the study of legitimacy, where he is considered the locus classicus of the “belief theory on
legitimacy.”38 The emphasis on “belief” in his approach to the study of
legitimacy has influenced countless subsequent thinkers,39 while at the
same time generating fierce critique from others.40 For instance, Carl J.
Friedrich sees legitimacy as a question of "whether a given rulership
is believed to be based on a good title by most men subject to it or
not."41 Peter Stillman on the other hand, writes that "the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a government is a matter not of popular opinion nor of
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belief about the ‘appropriateness’ or ‘good title’ of the government"42
and defines legitimacy as "the compatibility of the results of government output with the value patterns of the relevant systems."43 In the
Legitimation of Power (1991)44 David Beetham launches a fierce attack on
Weber's conception of legitimacy by arguing that Weber reduces legitimacy to a single dimension, i.e. belief in legitimacy, thereby voiding the
concept of objective and moral content. Moreover, Beetham contends
that elements such as legality and consent are independent of beliefs.45
In amending Weber's definition, Beetham asserts that "a given power
relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy,
but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs."46 Beetham's
own definition of legitimacy is based on three inextricably linked and,
according to him, universal components: conformity to rules (legal
validity), the justifiability of rules in terms of shared beliefs, and legitimation through expressed consent.47 For Beetham, power can be
considered legitimate when it conforms to these components. For the
moment, however, attention should be drawn to the third dimension,
which, as will be shown in what follows, is only applicable to governments and not regimes.
VI. Consent and Regimes
According to Beetham two conditions are necessary for action, at least
in a western-liberal context, to be considered an expression of consent. The first is the absence of coercion and the second is presence of
choice between alternatives. As he writes: "it is making an agreement
to subordination under conditions of choice between alternatives that
confers legitimacy on the exercise of power, and a corresponding obligation to obey."48 While he concedes that what counts as consent is
culturally specific and is thus not absolutely definable, he maintains
that "the convention within contemporary liberal democracies is that
it is the act of taking part in elections that legitimates government and
secures the obligation of citizens in principle to obey it."49 A regime
can be understood "as the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, of its relations with broader society. A regime
determines who has access to political power and how those who are
in power deal with those who are not."50 In addition, a regime tells us
something about the type of political system in place, e.g. authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and democracy.51 A regime is merely understood as a system of governance in the present context. Government,
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however, can be understood as "the actual exercise of political power
within the framework of the regime and, more specifically, to those
organizations and people charged with the duty of governing."52
It is by now evident that Beetham does not distinguish between governments and regimes in his discussion of consent. This has far more
serious implications for the applicability of his theory of legitimacy
to regimes than one might think at first glance. To say that citizens
express consent and confer legitimacy on governments by actively and
freely taking part in elections and thus choose between alternatives,
e.g. political parties, is a line of reasoning that is hard to contest. The
same line of reasoning is far less convincing when applied in the context of regimes. If the choice between alternatives is a necessary condition for expression of consent, then virtually no regime can claim
to enjoy the consent of citizens. In which society do people choose
a regime among alternatives and thus express their consent to that
regime? Equally important is how efficiency, stability, and continuity
can be ensured if a regime can be altered by a majority in society every
four years or so? While presence of choice between alternatives may be
significant in relation to legitimation of governments, it is clear that the
same cannot be the case for regimes. An important distinction between
a government and a regime is that the former is the latter's agent
of action, which can exercise power. A regime cannot exercise coercive power independent of a government. The relationship between a
regime and citizens is therefore not one characterized by direct dominance and subordination. Consequently, absence of organized public protests against a regime can be considered expression of consent,
especially when the regime conforms to society's normative order/
shared beliefs from whence it derives its legitimacy in the first place.
VII. Social Order without Authority
If a regime, understood in this context as a system of governance,
largely conforms to the shared beliefs in society, a likely result is that it
becomes indistinguishable from them in terms of legitimacy. Once this
happens, there is no need for citizens to confer legitimacy to the regime
through directly expressed consent. Acceptance of the shared beliefs in
society automatically translates into legitimation of the regime when
and if it conforms to the shared beliefs in society and the latter is
characterized by uniformity of shared beliefs. Since a regime cannot
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exercise power independent of a government, the absence of organized
public protest against it ought to be considered expression of consent
on the part of individuals in society. For Beetham, actions that publicly
express consent are important "because they constitute public expressions by the subordinate of their consent to the power relationship and
their subordinate position within it; of their voluntary agreement to
the limitation of their freedom by the requirements of a superior."53 In
the absence of a government or another authority, capable of exercising
coercive power, individuals' acceptance of their subordinate position
appears superfluous. How then can social order be obtained and maintained in a society where there is no formal authority that can exercise coercive power? Social order can be obtained, and public goods
provided in the absence of authority (e.g. government) if two conditions are met. Uniformity of shared beliefs, while important, is merely
a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. An equally important
condition is feasibility of collective action. In a society characterized
by feasibility of collective action and presence of uniformity of shared
beliefs, the normative order in society turns into a moral authority
with the capacity to issue commands and demand obedience. People
then obey rules and consent to norms because of subjective moral
obligations to obey rather than due to fear of sanction. In other words,
people obey rules because they can be justified in terms of their beliefs.
VIII. Heer and Social Order in Pre-Colonial Somali Society
The critical and observant reader might at this point have noted that
the preceding discussion on the obtainment of social order and provision of public goods in the absence of a formal government or any
other type of authority is highly hypothetical. Evidently, collective
action is normally not feasible in large groups in the absence of coercion, hierarchy or utilization of selective incentives, let alone in large
societies.54 While an established normative framework undeniably
contributes to social cohesion, it is quite evident that the shared norms
and values that underpin it do not simply obtain but must be constructed,55 and it is hard to imagine how that could be done in the
absence of a state and government. It is nevertheless the case that collective action, as discussed in previous sections of the present paper,
was feasible both within and between communities in pre-colonial
Somali society. Equally important for understanding the obtainment of
social order and provision of public goods in pre-colonial Somali soci175
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ety, by voluntary agreement and consent, is the uniformity of shared
beliefs that characterized it.
To understand how the Xeer system could issue commands and
demand obedience in the absence of an authority that could enforce
rules, laws, and decisions by coercive means, we must look at the
ultimate source of legitimacy in pre-colonial Somali society. Beetham
argues that to understand justifiability of rules one must identify the
authoritative source from which they stem. As he writes, "it is the
impressiveness of the source from which they derive as well as the
moral persuasiveness of their content that gives social rules their justifiability."56 A distinction can, according to Beetham, be drawn between
external and internal sources of legitimacy of rules. Pre-colonial Somali
society derived the legitimacy of its rules from Islam (external source)
and from its own cultural legacy, i.e. tradition. All Somalis adhere to
Sunni-Islam57 and are virtually culturally homogeneous,58 stressing
the uniformity of shared beliefs in society. There was, due to high level
of cultural homogeneity, limited need for negotiating which values
and norms that ought to be considered universal. Likewise, complete
religious homogeneity meant limited need for interpretation of divine
will. In other words, the Xeer system, a regime without a government,
could issue commands and demand obedience because it completely
conformed to the shared beliefs in society. For this reason, the laws,
rules, values, principles, and norms that constitute the Xeer system
were considered legitimate. Hence, uniformity of shared beliefs
together with feasibility of collective action was sufficient for provision
of public goods and obtainment of social order in a society characterized by the absence of formal authority and hierarchy.
IX. Conclusion
As has been shown in this essay, pre-colonial Somali society constituted
a large society, where social order was obtained by voluntary agreement
and consent among individuals, equal amongst one another. Man's life,
liberty and estate was, in other words, guaranteed in the absence of hierarchy and authority, capable of exercising coercive power. Uniformity of
shared beliefs in society together with feasibility of collective action, both
within and between communities, enabled the Xeer system, a regime
without a government, to demand obedience or rather duty. As the Xeer
system completely conformed to the shared beliefs in society, its content
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was considered legitimate. Consequently, might was turned into right
and obedience into duty. As the present case suggests, it is possible to
produce a civil society characterized by political liberty, where man is
not subject to inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another
man, in the absence of formal authority to settle disputes, punish offenders and protect the wronged.
Asserted earlier in the essay, the Somali people inhabit a huge area
on the horn of Africa of about 643.7376 square kilometers,59 stretching
from present day Djibouti in the north to present day northern Kenya in
the south. There is consensus in the academic literature that the Somali
nation has never been governed by a centralized authority prior to European colonization in the 19th century. It is therefore hard to explain
how religious, cultural, and linguistic homogeneity was constructed in
the first place. Even more difficult to comprehend is how uniformity
of shared beliefs, stemming from cultural and religious homogeneity,
was preserved in the absence of a central authority. It is likewise hard to
explain why collective action was feasible. Evidently, collective action is
not feasible in large groups in the absence of coercion, hierarchy or utilization of selective incentives, let alone in large societies.60 While explaining why collective action was feasible is beyond the scope of this essay, it
has been proposed that it was so both within and between communities,
making pre-colonial Somali society the sole known large society characterized by feasibility of collective action. The intrinsic predicament of
collective action is one revolving around a conflict between individual
rationality and collective rationality. Put differently, what is rational on
an individual level is not rational on the collective level, making collective action in large groups, in the absence of coercion, hierarchy or
utilization of selective incentives, virtually impossible.61 If we assume
that people are very reasonable and rational as assumed in classical
social contract theories,62 is it not sound to suggest that precisely their
rationality and reason will become an implacable enemy of collective
action? It appears that people in pre-colonial Somali society were not
merely reasonable enough to comprehend and appreciate the utility of
civil liberty, they were at the same time prudent and provident enough
to suspend their individual rationality, rendering collective action feasible.
Lastly, Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence from
Somalia in 1991 in the wake of the Somali civil-war and currently func177
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tions as a de-facto sovereign state, is often referred to as one of few
successful peace/state-building cases in the post-Cold War era.63 By
mixing Somali institutions of governance with constitutional democracy and by institutionalizing the former (the Guurti), Somaliland has
created an organic and legitimate hybrid state rooted in society. In
doing so, Somaliland has transcended the (semi) Weberian OECDmodel of statehood64 and given birth to the hybrid turn in the literature on peace and state building. Unique to the Somaliland case is
that successful peace/state-building was achieved in the absence of
foreign intervention, mediation or any other form of foreign aid. In
other words, the processes of peace and state building in Somaliland
were internally led and characterized by local ownership. A substantial body of scholarship brings attention to the instrumentalization
of Somaliland's cultural-specific conflict resolution methods (e.g.
Shiir and Guurti councils) in explaining successful peace and state
building in Somaliland.65 The scholarship on Somaliland's peace and
state-building achievements is, however, characterized by lack of focus
on feasibility of collective action and uniformity of shared beliefs in
society. It is highly doubtful that peace and state-building could have
been achieved without foreign intervention if collective action was not
feasible within and between the different communities in Somaliland.
Research that brings feasibility of collective action and uniformity of
shared beliefs into the center of analysis could deepen and enhance our
understanding of the internally led peace/state building processes in
Somaliland and ultimately answer the question as to why Somaliland
remains the sole known example of successful post-civil-war peace/
state-building characterized by local ownership.66 Furthermore, does
Somaliland not constitute an example of company of men, independent and equal one amongst one another, that met together and set up
a government and a state?67
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58. While the Somali nation is often referred to as being homogeneous in terms
of race, culture, language and religion, it is important to bring attention to the
existence of both linguistic and racial minorities in Somalia see e.g. Besteman,
1999. Existence of such minorities is, however, not taken to be important in the
present context. Their existence does not alter the fact that pre-colonial Somali
society constitutes the sole known example of a large society where social
order was obtained by voluntary agreement and consent among individuals.
59. Khayre, 2016.
60. Olson, 1965.
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62. See e.g. Rousseau, 1993; Locke, 1948.
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Richmond, 2009; Donais, 2009; Millar, 2014), it remains the case that nobody
has yet explained how post-conflict societies can produce successful peace/
state-building without foreign intervention. It appears logical and reasonable
to propose that collective action must be feasible both within and between
different communities if sustainable peace/state building efforts are to emerge
sustainable in post-conflict environments.
67. In the Second Treatise of Government John Locke wrote “There are no
instances to be found in story of a company of men, independent and equal
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